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NOTHING IS PART OF EVERYTHING1
 
 
Paolo Valore2
 
 
 
 
 
«Lui in sé non vale altro che nulla, e tutti i nulli  
dell’universo sono eguali ad un sol nulla 
in quanto alla loro sostanza e valore»  
(Leonardo da Vinci, “Trattato della pittura”)  
1.Definitions 
I will assume the language of general Extensional mereology, that is, a mereology 
without intensional operators (such as modal or temporal functions)3. The axiom system 
for mereology requires a single primitive concept: the parthood relation, symbolized as 
. The -relation4 is assumed to be (a) reflexive, (b) antisymmetric and (c) transitive5. 
Note that the parthood relation is a partial ordering, as defined in set theory6
                                                          
1 This article has been written during a semester at the Department of Philosophy of NYU, New York, as a 
Fulbright Visiting Scholar. I want to thank my students at the University of Milan for the discussions on 
section 6. A former version of some ideas of this paper has been presented in Valore (2008). 
. Since 
parthood is analogous to inclusion, I can define a relation somehow analogous to proper 
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Milan. 
3 Extensionality essentially amounts to the assumption that two entities are identical if and only if they 
have the same parts. This means I will give up any distinction between entities made up of the same parts 
in different order (for any meaning of “order", both spatial or temporal). This assumption mirrors the 
fundamental principle of set theory: two sets are identical if and only if they have the same members. 
This choice does raise some problems for the intuitive notion of “part", but it is not relevant for the issue 
I want to discuss here. 
4 Cfr. Les´niewski (1992), pp. 131-132. Note that Leśniewski’s notion of part is what I shall hereafter call 
“proper part", while what I define “part" is called, in his writings, “ingredient". 
5 For (a) cfr. Les´niewski (1992), § 2, theorem I I . For (b) cfr. Les´niewski (1992), § 1, axiom I, 
relative to “proper parts", alongside definition I in § 2; cfr. also Simons (1987), p. 10. For (c) cfr. 
Les´niewski (1992), § 3, theorem IV; Tarski (1929), postulate I. Cfr. also Simons (1987), p. 10. 
6 This relation is in many respects analogous to inclusion among sets (this is obviously no more than an 
analogy, for mereology doesn’t deal with sets of elements, but with entities and parts thereof). Consider 
for example the powerset P (U) of any set U: assuming ”Xi” as variables for sets, the relation R  defined 
as:  
  
is a partial ordering based on inclusion between subsets. 
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inclusion. Such a relation exists, and is called “proper parthood” (“ ”7). It can be 
considered as a special instance of , when it holds of (x,y) but not of (y,x) (in all cases, 
that is, when x ≠ y)8
 
:  
 
. The ordering introduced by “ ” can be rendered by a diagram as follows: all 
elements are represented by nodes; the antisymmetric relation  
  
can be rendered by locating node b underneath the node a:  
 
 
 
; the transitive relation  
  
can be rendered by placing b underneath a and c underneath both a and b: 
 
. Clearly, interpreting each node in this diagram as representing an entity, it could be read 
as a representation of the relations holding between entity a and its proper parts. If a has 
                                                          
7 The double symbol used here reproduces a use found in in Leonard & Goodman (1940) and Simons 
(1987), p. 10. 
8 Cfr. Les´niewski (1992), § 1, theorem I; Tarski (1929), definition I. Cfr. also Simons (1987), p. 10. 
Note that an easier way of stating the definition might have been:  
 
 
 
. I have nonetheless preferred to define proper parthood only in terms of the parthood relation. The axiom 
of antisimmetricy  
  
could still be interpreted as a definition of =, thereby making identity a concept derived from the 
primitive notion of part: two entities x and y are identical if and only if x y and y x. 
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at least two proper parts (b and c) which aren’t part of each other, I can represent the 
relation holding between them as follows:  
 
 
 
 
. From the primitive concept of part, and its axioms, it is possibile to define the notion of 
atom as a derived concept (which should occupy the lowermost position in the diagrams). 
I’ll define “atom” (referred to with indexed variables such as , , …)9 as an entity 
with no proper parts (that is, entity x such that, if entity y is part of it, then it is identical 
to it)10
 
:  
 
. This definition has the advantage of being consistent with the intuitive idea of an atom 
as the residue of an object’s progressive decomposition11. From the primitive concept of 
part, “overlapping”12 can also be introduced: intuitively, two entities overlap if they share 
some content. I will indicate that x overlaps with y as follows: “x y”:  
  
. This can be rendered as follows:  
 
 
                                                          
9 For the ease of the reader I reserve a set of dedicated variables to atoms, although strictly speaking a 
predicate with the same definition would have been more perspicuous. 
10 Meixner (1997), p. 29 offers an equivalent definition:  
 
– notational conventions are uniformed to the standards I adopted here. 
11  The admittance of atoms, however, is not inevitable. One might design a mereological system rejecting 
the notion of atom, adding an axiom as  
 
and generating diagrams with an upper bound (U) but no lower bound. Such a universe is made of 
entities with proper parts, which have proper parts themselves, and so on. This possibility, since ◁◁ is 
anti-symmetric, is granted only by an infinite cardinality of models for the theory – cfr. Varzi (1996). 
Such a model could be provided by open sets in a euclidean space, interpreting parthood as set-theoretic 
inclusion – cfr. Tarski (1935).  
12 Cfr. Goodman (1958) and Simons (1987), pp. 11-12. 
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. Overlapping is reflexive, as is parthood, but, unlike the latter, it is symmetric and 
intransitive13. Two objects that don’t overlap are said to be discrete14. To state that x and 
y are discrete I write as follows: “x  y”.  
  
. Or, which is analogous – since parthood and overlapping are mutually definable – two 
objects are discrete if they share no part15. All objects are thus either atoms or fusions of 
atoms, where “fusion” is taken to informally16 mean the entity consisting of certain 
entities as its only parts17
 
. If I apply without restrictions the idea of fusion, I can generate 
the notion of a “universe”, a total mereological fusion “U”. This plays a similar role to 
the universal class in set theory, with a significant difference: U is an individual 
composed of all parts of all individuals, and not a set thereof.  
2. Trying to Fill the Gap 
The mereological analog of the empty set should be an individual, which might be called 
“null object”18. Mereology, in its traditional formulation, avoids all reference to null 
objects19
                                                          
13 Naturally, if it is the case that exactly the same individuals overlap with two objects, then the two objects 
are identical:  
 (as we will see, with good reasons). Some systems, however, do try to define a 
  
14 Cfr. Tarski (1929), def. II, p. 25. 
15 Cfr. Rescher (1955), def. I, p. 9:  
  
16 More formally, I can define the fusion of objects x and y (in symbols: ”x  y”) as follows:  
  
that is: the fusion of two individuals is the individual overlapping exactly with all individuals overlapping 
with either of the two. 
17 I will not discuss here the difference between sum and fusion, for it is not relevant for my purpose. On 
such distinction, cfr. Simons (1987). 
18 Cfr. Martin (1943), p. 3; Carnap (1947), p. 65. 
19 Cfr. Leonard & Goodman (1940), p. 46, and Casati & Varzi (1999). 
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null object  as a particular instance of atom20. The admission of a null object could 
seem ontologically suspicious, but it has the advantage of allowing mereology to develop 
the analogy with set theory to its fullest extent21. From a purely formal point of view, 
such an introduction raises no problems; from an ontological point of view, on the other 
hand, one might wonder what sort of relation holds between atoms and the null object. 
Actually, it is the ontological point of view which has prompted us to test whether 
mereology could be a good replacement of set theory22
Since it is true of the empty set that:  
.  
  
, I could attempt an initial definition of “ ”, adding to the requirements imposed on 
atoms an analog of such condition:23
 
:  
 
. Clearly, the introduction of  shouldn’t imply the non-existence of any atom other than 
, for it has been defined as a special instance of , through an additional specification. 
On the other hand, if I accept the aforementioned definitions, atoms and null object 
collapse onto each other. This is even more significant if I consider that the null object is 
an individual constant, while atom is a predicate logically capable of being true of more 
than one individual. Condition  (alongside the definition of ) implies that one 
of the following must hold: either (a) x = z or (b) x z.  
                                                          
20 Bunge (1966) proposes even more than one kind of null individual. A particular kind of atom has the 
same role in Meixner (1997), p. 29: it is the “minimal atom", which is part of every object. 
21 If mereology is to represent a serviceable replacement of set theory, it must try to rebuild its fundamental 
notions through the tools it has (that is, nothing but individuals and the primitive parthood relation). 
22 Goodman, for instance, uses it to avoid all reference to entities such as sets, limiting himself to a 
calculus of individuals. The stance at ontological neutrality was first implied, at the discipline’s earliest 
outsets (such as Leśniewski’s) in the interpretation of existential quantifiers. Classical mereology, to 
avoid suspicious ontological commitments, imposed a non-referential quantification. In quantification 
theory an expression such as  
  
isn’t valid, for I can’t be sure that there is something which is P. Early mereology, by imposing a non-
referential quantification, always verified the aforementioned inference, limiting the distinction between 
quantifiers to a distinction between a universal and particular distribution of predicate P. In Leśniewski’s 
ontology, for instance, it is provable that for some a, a doesn’t exist (cfr. Simons (1987), p. 20). On the 
other hand, it is provable that mereology’s alleged ontological innocence is more apparent than real: cfr. 
Carrara & Martino (2001), pp. 75-110, and Yi (1999). 
23 Cfr. Meixner (1997), pp. 29-31. 
Paolo Valore, Nothing is part of Everything 
 
7 
(a) This clearly can’t be the case, for the definition is nontrivial only if z ≠ . If 
, then x z becomes a trivial consequence of the reflexivity of : 
the x in the previous definition is taken for , so that x z would amount, in this 
case, to , which is an instance of  ( ).  
(b) Suppose then that z. Applying the definition of “ ” I obtain:  
  
Which means: every entity which is not  has  as its proper part (while  has no 
proper parts of its own).  
 would then be a proper part of every other entity in the universe. This means that 
the last residue of the decomposition of any fusion will be , and “atom” becomes a 
useless synonym of “null object”: for every entity which is not  has at least a proper 
part, and atoms have no proper parts, then  is the only atom. It is clear, on the other 
hand, that I can’t give up characterizing  as an atom: the null object can’t have 
proper parts, for there cannot be a part of nothing which is different from nothing.  
An alternative hypothesis could suppose not to consider  a particular instance of , 
instead defining the latter in terms of . The idea is to define the null object as follows:  
  
and then:  
  
. In other terms, an atom is an object x such that  
  
. This amounts to saying that the only proper part of atoms is the null object. In this case, 
obviously, the definition can’t hold for  as the x in y x, for no object can be a proper 
part of itself; the definition of  would nonetheless be satisfied by  as well, because if 
x = y = , then the antecedent in the definition would be false (although the consequent 
would be true), so as to satisfy the whole formula. The atom would be defined in a 
somewhat counter-intuitive way, but it would be the only one compatible with the 
assumption that the null object is part of everything. This would make  an instance of 
 based on the truth table for →, in particular: “false → true”.  
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Nothing prevents our system from avoiding such definition and subsequently not 
defining  as an atom, which wouldn’t be in itself a contradiction, for I can always give 
up the intuitive concept of atom within a context of prescriptive ontology. An atom 
would then not be a simple part, but a simple part different from :  
  
In this way, neither the <false→true> nor the <false→false> cases would be applicable. 
If the antecedent is false, I can’t verify the first clause in the conjunction, but if the 
antecedent is true, then necessarily y = . If I accept this revised definition I must reject 
what I just said, that  is a particular instance of . At the beginning,  was defined as 
such, by adding a clause to the definition of atom:  
  
so that:  
  
. I can naturally keep this definition, which is now independent from (2**).  
 
 
5. Enigmatic Trees 
By accepting the second definition of atom, what I obtain is that an atom is every entity 
which has no proper parts besides the null object. I could now represent the relation 
between an atom  and  as follows:  
 
 
 
. This diagram, however, clearly shows that something is wrong, for the atom cannot 
have a single proper part. If I want to state that ≠ , the axiom of extensionality 
requires  to be a fusion of  and at least another proper part different from . If it 
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were a fusion of  and , then  wouldn’t be a proper part of it, so that, once again, 
= . To save the notion of “atom”, then, I could specify that atoms ought to be the 
fusions of  and the atom itself. But this relation couldn’t be rendered in a meaningful 
diagram:  
 
 
 
 
. This can’t be accepted, for  can’t be a proper part of itself. I could perhaps rewrite it 
thus: 
 
 
 
where ≠ . And clearly if this were the case, the true atom would be  – but this 
would once again be meaningless, for, since there are no proper parts of  besides  (  
wouldn’t count, for it is part of both), we’d have one more time  =  = . Anyway, 
even if this diagram made any sense (and it doesn’t), it would generate another cascade 
of atoms:  should have  as its proper part, and as such it should have a proper part 
besides  – suppose, , and so on:  
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. This is absurd, because  is a single object (this was known to Leonardo da Vinci: “all 
nothings in the universe are just one single nothing in their substance”): there is just one 
null object.  
 
 
  
In general, I could wonder: if I imagine two objects a and b, such that a  b, which are 
fusions, respectively, of c and  and of d and , so that  c and  d: 
 
 
 
, what is the relationship between the two atoms ,  and the null object?  Can they 
have as sole proper part the same null object?  In this case, they would share a proper 
part, and so , but this would mean a d, which contradicts our initial hypothesis. 
Moreover,  and  have the same proper parts (nothing but ), so, in an Extensional 
mereology, they should be the same entity, and the diagram should be rewritten as:  
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 and so on, through c = e and up to a = d, from our initial assertion that a  d!  Note, 
moreover, that this unexpected result would render a = d = U, and so U = , which would 
likely mean something similar to everything being identical with nothing. 
The problem for a, b, c and d can be trivially solved by considering that, if ex 
hypothesi a  b, then a ≠ b, and so they must have distinct proper parts, and hence they 
must have more than one. The same argument should in turn apply to c with  and d 
with : if the atoms are proper parts of c and d, respectively, they can’t be identical to 
them. So they can’t be their only proper parts: 
 
 
 
  
. This would mean that, if an object has a proper part, then it must have at least two (that 
is, another proper part distinct from the first). This request is made by means of a 
supplementation axiom, which imposes that a fusion always be a fusion of n > 1 parts. 
If any supplementation axiom adds a clause to c being proper part of a and to  being 
proper part of c (and the same for the other branch of the diagram), I won’t be able to 
satisfy that clause by adding a ramification at the lower end of the diagram. 
Our definition of atom implies it has no proper parts but . 
When I try to apply the supplementation axiom to the definition of atoms and the null 
object, the only solution would be considering atoms as fusions of themselves and the 
null object – which would end up in cascading diagrams as the ones seen before. The 
only solution would be stating that the supplementation axiom and the principle of 
extensionality do not apply to atoms and to the null object.  
All this argument, in the end, seems to prove how the acceptance of a null object in a 
mereological system will complicate the latter up to the point of absurdity or 
inconsistency (or to adding whole sets of ad hoc axioms).  
www.giornaledifilosofia.net 
 
6. A Model 
Suppose now to assume the set  of the natural numbers as domain of quantification and 
to read the -relation as “is a divisor of”.  
Consequently, proper parthood has to be read as “is a divisor of but not identical to” 
and overlapping as “having a common divisor different than 1”. In particular, an atom is 
now any prime number (1 included or excluded, according to the decision to accept the 
first definition or the second one).  
Please note that the definition of identity as “having exactly the same parts” still holds 
within this interpretation: two natural numbers are the same natural number if and only if 
the have the same prime divisors. Going back to the problematic diagrams I built before, 
I can now remark that an atom (a prime number such as 2) has, as its parts, the atom itself 
and the null object (1). So that  
 
 
 
now makes complete sense. So does the case of the decomposition of a number in factors 
that do not have common divisors different than 1: 
 
 
 
. The price for this interpretation is that we cannot have any “Universe” in this model, 
that is, that in order to accept both atoms and the null-object, we seem forced to design a 
mereological system so to generate diagrams with a lower bound but no upper bound.  
And the fact that we cannot generate the total mereological fusion makes the analogy 
with set theory (where it is impossible to generate the “Universal set”) yet more 
intriguing. 
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